THE CYBERWORLD CANNOT BE CONFINED TO SPEECH
THAT WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR A SANDBOX'
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech."2 Our Founding Fathers could never have foreseen the powerful and controversial effect that these ten simple words would have
on our nation." The guarantee of freedom of speech is essential to
our government and our society, among other reasons, to encourage
the "marketplace of ideas,"4 to enhance political participation,5 and
to amplify personal autonomy.6 Despite these important interests,
See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) ("The level of
discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.").
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in full: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances." Id.
3 See Michael Kent Curds, Criticsof "FreeSpeech"
and the Uses of the Past, 12 CONST.
COMMENTARY 29, 29 (1995) (focusing on the complex and emotional divisions existing between advocates of free speech and those who feel that free speech is a threat
to equality); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 576 (1978)
(describing the First Amendment as the "Constitution's most majestic guarantee"
and a "basic element of our fundamental law"). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REv. 203 (1994) (providing an overview of differing philosophies of free speech throughout the past century).
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The "marketplace of ideas" theory was expressed by Justice Holmes, who
wrote, "The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution."
Id.
See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 577. The conception of the "marketplace of ideas"
is not an exclusive argument for the freedom of speech. See id. at 576-77. In order
to analyze the First Amendment, the Court has relied on several types of theories
because of the large variety of communicational modes. See id. at 579. See generally
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)

(proffering the theory that freedom of speech is necessary to preserve selfgovernment within the system of democracy).
6 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). Justice Harlan emphasized
that freedom of speech allows not only the conveyance of ideas of precise expression, but it allows for the conveyance of inexpressible emotions too. See id. Harlan
articulated, "We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of
the cognitive content of individual speech has little or no regard for that emotive
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the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to exclude specific classifications of speech from its umbrella
of protection.' Among these unprotected classifications is obscene
speech, which the Court has deemed lacking in all of the values that
motivated the Founders to protect free speech.8 Nonetheless, the
Court has traditionally protected sexually oriented, indecent speech
when that speech does not rise to the level of obscenity! Although
the Court has recognized several purposes for regulating both inde-

function which practically speaking, may often be the more important element of
the overall message sought to be communicated." Id. Justice Frankfurter expressed
the importance of freedom of all types of speech: "One of the prerogatives of
American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures - and that
means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation." Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74
(1944); see also TRIBE, supranote 3, at 579.
7 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758
(1982) (holding that material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct is unprotected speech, even if the material is not obscene); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (stating that
advocacy directed at producing or inciting imminent lawless action and likely to
produce or incite such action is not constitutionally protected speech); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscene speech is not constitutionally protected speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942) (stating that "fighting words" and defamation receive no First Amendment
protection).
There are two ways in which the government may attempt to regulate speech.
See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 580. The government's regulation may be aimed at the
content of speech, known as "content-based" regulations. See id. These attempts are
considered presumptively against the First Amendment if they are not directed at
unprotected speech. See id. at 581. Alternatively, the government's regulation may
be aimed at the secondary effects of speech, known as "content-neutral" regulations.
See id. at 580. In scrutinizing content-neutral regulations, the Court will generally
balance the competing interests. See id. at 581. Content-neutral statutes will be
held constitutional provided that "they do not unduly constrict the flow of information and ideas." Id. at 581-82.
a See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354 (1971) (holding that the government may prohibit the mailing of obscene material); Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
In order for speech to be classified as obscene, it must meet the difficult
threshold set forth in Miller v. California. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973). Obscene speech has been held to be categorically unprotected speech in
all contexts because its content is extremely offensive to moral standards. See Roth,
354 U.S. at 485. In Roth, the defendant was prosecuted under a federal statute for
mailing obscene material. See id. at 481. The Supreme Court held that obscene
.utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality..." Id. at 485. But
see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that government may not
prohibit private possession of obscenity).
See Sable v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at
764-65; Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (holding that
a zoning ordinance that prohibited live nude dancing was unconstitutional).
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cent and obscene speech, including preventing secondary effects'
and preserving a moral society," few purposes have been more pervasive than protecting children from exposure.12
As new communication technologies have evolved since the
birth of the First Amendment, the danger of children being exposed
to obscene or indecent speech has increased dramatically."' These
changes in mass communication media over the past several decades
have prompted the Court to uphold Congress's regulation of otherwise constitutionally protected, sexually oriented, indecent speech'
Thus, the Court is continuously faced with the issue: How much
governmental regulation is justified to protect children from this
material without infringing upon adults' constitutional rights?'
In addressing this question, the Supreme Court has maintained
a fine balance 6 between permissible governmental regulations and
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986); Paris Adult
S0
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973) (recognizing the interest of the public
safety, quality of life, and tone of commerce in restricting obscene material).
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569-72 (1991) (upholding a public
indecency statute that required nude dancers to wear pasties and G-strings); see also
Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (holding that the legislature may act to protect "the social interest in order and morality").
1
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (holding that the interest in protecting children justifies regulating otherwise protected speech); Paris
Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 58 (recognizing an interest of the public safety, quality of
life, and tone of commerce in restricting obscene material); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (articulating that the state has an interest in the well-being
of children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-70 (1944) (opining that restricting harmful material is necessary for healthy, well-rounded children).
is See Allen S. Hammond, VI, Indecent Proposals: Reason, Restraint and Responsibility in the Regulation of Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENr. L.J. 259, 266-71 (1996)
(explaining the harmful effects of indecent speech on children and the greater
control of access that children have to indecent speech due to modern media of
communication).
1 See Pacifica,438 U.S. at 749 (holding that the government
may utilize contentbased regulations that target constitutionally protected speech in certain contexts).
For a summary of several indecency-based and obscenity-based laws, see LANCE
ROSE, NETAw: YOUR RIGHTS IN THE ONLINE WORLD 248-49 (1995). See generally
Nicholas Wolfson, Eroticism, Obscenity, Pornographyand Free Speech, 60 BROOK. L. REv.
1037 (1994) (discussing the history of obscene and pornographic speech and governmental attempts to regulate them).
Is SeeSable v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). The legitimate interest in protecting children from harmful material must be achieved "by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First
Amendment freedoms." Id.
16 See ROSE, supra note 14, at 249. The Supreme Court struck a balance
with
Congress that the First Amendment generally protects sexually oriented material
from government interference, unless the material is deemed to be child pornography or obscene. See id.

1998]

FREE SPEECH AND THE INTERNET

289

protection of the freedom of speech by applying distinct levels of
scrutiny to each medium." Most recently, in Reno v. ACLU, "sthe
Court examined the newest mode of communication - the Internet.
The Court held that two provisions of the Communications Decency
Act (CDA)' 9 that attempted to prevent dissemination of "indecent"
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). In deciding
what level of scrutiny to apply to broadcasting, Justice White wrote, "[D]ifferences
in the characteristics of new mediajustify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them." Id. (citations omitted); see alsoJONATHAN WALLACE & MARK
MANGAN, SEX, LAWS, AND CYBERSPACE 231-34 (1996) (reviewing the history of governmental regulation of mass media of communication). Each new medium of
communication has driven our society closer together, although each has been met
with fear and trepidation at first. See id. at 231. In 1535, King Francois I, fearing
that the new medium of printed books might cause blasphemy and political opposition, banned all printing. SeeJonathan Wallace & Mark Mangan, Sex, Laws, and Cyberspace (visited July 19, 1998) <http://www.spectacle.org/freespch/compass/
.html>. In the United States of America, the introduction of the telephone was met
with skepticism because of the potential for offensive language. See id. Congress, in
fear of new media, has often hastily attempted to regulate without studying either
the medium or the potential effects of the regulation. See WALLACE & MANGAN, supra, at 232; see also THOMASJ. SMEDINCHOFF, ONLINE LAw 310-13 (1996) (discussing

the different problems associated with each of the major mass communication media and how the Court must take these differences into consideration).
is 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997).
19 Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 223(a)-(h)). The first provision at issue provides in pertinent part:
Whoever

-

(1) in interstate or foreign communications .
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly -

(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the
recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed
the call or initiated the communication...
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under
his control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph
(1) with the intent that it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.
47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1996).
The second provision at issue provides in pertinent part:
Whoever

-

(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly (A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a
specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a
manner available to a person under 18 years of age,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
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and "patently offensive" material to minors were vague and facially
overbroad in violation of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. 0
The CDA, part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,1 included two hastily drafted provisions designed to protect minors
from receiving harmful material via the Internet.22 These two provisions subjected violators to criminal liability for the transmission of
any "indecent" or "patently offensive" material to minors via the Internet. 23 Immediately after President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act, the American Civil Liberties Union and several
other groups filed suit against the Attorney General of the United
States and the Department of Justice. 4 Two weeks later, the Americommunication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of
whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under
such person's control to be used for any activity prohibited by
paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.
47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1996).
20 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2846, 2348.
21 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.). Title V of the Telecommunications Act was known as the "Communication
Decency Act of 1996" (CDA). See Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2338. President Clinton signed
the Telecommunications Act on February 8, 1996. See id. at 2339. The primary
purpose of the Telecommunications Act was not to address the Internet, but rather
to encourage "the rapid development of new telecommunication technologies." Id.
at 2337-38 (citations omitted). The Telecommunications Act was approved by the
Senate in an 84-16 vote in the summer of 1995. See WALLACE & MANGAN, supra note
17, at 186.
See Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2338 & n.24. The CDA provisions were hardly deliberated by Congress and were not subject to any hearings. See id. Senator Leahy
stated, "'The Senate... passed legislation, and never once had a hearing, never
once had a discussion other than an hour or so on the floor.'" See id. (quoting Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, the State of Technology, and the Need for
CongressionalAction: Hearingon S.892 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 104th
Cong. 7-8 (1995) (statement of Senator Leahy)); see also Richard Raysman & Peter
Brown, Reno v. ACLU - The First Amendment Meets the Internet, N.Y.L.J.,July 8, 1997,
at 3 (describing the CDA as hastily drafted legislation). Senator Exon, a Democrat,
proposed the CDA as an amendment to the Telecommunications Act. See WALLA CE
& MANGAN, supra note 17, at 177.
23 See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a),
(d) (1996). The penalty for violating the CDA includes fines of up to $250,000 under Title 18 or imprisonment for no more than
two2ears.
See Raysman & Brown, supra note 22, at 3.
See Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2339. The plaintiffs were originally made up of 20 civil
rights and Internet groups. See id. They filed their complaint on February 8, 1996.
See id.
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can Library Association, several on-line services, and numerous civil
rights groups filed a similar suit. 2 These two cases were subsequently
consolidated into one cause of action before a three-judge panel in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania."6 The panel granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the enforcement of the two challenged
provisions of the CDA.2
One week after the original complaint was filed, District Judge Buckwalter entered a temporary restraining order preventing the enforcement of
§ 223(a)(1)(B)(ii). See ACLU v. Reno, 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1379 (E.D. Pa.
1996). Judge Buckwalter based this decision on his finding that the term
"indecent" was too vague for the basis of a criminal prosecution. See id.
Joe Shea, editor of the American Reporter, also filed a separate complaint on
February 8, 1996 in New York federal court claiming that the CDA violated the First
Amendment. SeeSheav. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In Shea, the
court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of the CDA. See
id. at 950. The court held that the CDA was overbroad and could not be saved by
the affirmative defenses in the statute. See id. One day after the Reno decision, the
Court affirmed Shea v. Reno without an opinion. See Shea v. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2501
(1997).
25 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2339. For a summary of several critical
opinions of the
CDA, see JONATHAN ROSENOER, CYBERLAW - THE LAW OF THE INTERNET 187 (1997).
Supporters of the CDA argue that the dangers of pornography on the Internet necessitate restriction of indecent speech. See Cathleen A. Cleaver, Kids Need Protection
in Cyberspace, Too, NEWSDAY, Feb. 12, 1996, at A25. Advocates claim that courts will
take literary value into account and that the CDA will thus not criminalize such
works as Shakespeare orJoyce. See id. Furthermore, supporters argue that the types
of material on the Internet go beyond indecency and into the realm of barbarism.
See Arianna Huffington, Curbing Internet Pornography Would Safeguard Our Children,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, March 29, 1996, at 17C. Supporters claim that the CDA is
necessary because parents are not able to control the cultural influences that mold
their children's lives. See id.
24
See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2339. The panel was assembled pursuant to an expedited review provision in the CDA. See id.
27 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The preliminary
injunction prevented the enforcement of the prohibitions in § 223(a)(1)(B) only to
the extent that they relate to "indecent" communications, however, the decision still
permitted the government to prosecute individuals who send "obscene" material or
child pornography, as these materials are not protected by the First Amendment.
See id. Each of the three judges wrote a separate opinion, but their judgment was
unanimous. See id. ChiefJudge Sloviter, although holding that the governmental
interest may be compelling with respect to some material, concluded that the provisions were overbroad and vague with respect to the terms "indecent" and "patently
offensive." See id. at 854, 856. ChiefJudge Sloviter further held that the affirmative
defenses were not feasible. See id. at 856. Judge Buckwalter was concerned with the
"fundamental constitutional principle" of "simple fairness" and that criminal enforcement of the CDA would be unfair because of their vagueness. See id. at 861.
Judge Dalzell opined that the provisions at issue infringed upon the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. See id. at 883. The judge stated that
the Internet is the "most participatory form of mass speech yet developed" and
should therefore be given the highest protection. Id.
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The government appealed to the United States Supreme Court
under the CDA's special review provisions. 2 The Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction,2 and through the decision, safeguarded
the Internet from future governmental interference by providing full
protection of the First Amendment to the new medium. 0 The Court
found the provisions of the CDA to be content-based blanket restrictions on speech.' Therefore, the Court reverted to traditional strict
scrutiny standards3 2 and held that the interest in protecting minors
was not compelling enough to outweigh the interest in protecting
adults' access to constitutionally protected speech on the Internet.
The Court found that the provisions were not narrowly tailoredM and
that they were vague and overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.

In 1968, the Supreme Court set forth a standard of review applicable to print-based media and minors in Ginsberg v. New York, In
Ginsberg, the Court examined a statute that prohibited the sale of
material to minors that is obscene as to minors even if the material is
not obscene as to adults. 7 The Court determined that the magazines
28

See Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2340-41 (citing Communications Decency Act of 1996,

Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561, 110 Stat. 142, 142-43 (1996)).
29
See id.at 2340-41.
so See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351; Raysman & Brown, supra note 22, at 3. Justice Stevens concluded his opinion by stating that the freedom of expression outweighs any
unproven theoretical benefits of censorship. See Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2351.
,I See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
32 See id. at 2343. The Court found that none
of the special factors that havejustified regulating content over broadcast media, such as invasive nature or scarcity of
spectrum, were present in the Internet medium and, therefore, the Court closely
analyzed the statute to determine whether there were any less restrictive means. See
id. at 2343-44, 2346-48; cf Monroe E. Price &John F. Duffy, Technological Change and
DoctrinalPersistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97 COLUM.
L. REv. 976 (1997) (expressing the opinion that the Court is creating fundamental
changes in First Amendment precedence even though telecommunications and
telecommunication regulations have not changed much).
33
See Reno 117 S.Ct. at 2346. The Justice stated that there is a legitimate interest to protect minors from receiving harmful material on the Internet. See id.
34 See id.
at 2348.
ssSee id. at 2346, 2347. The Court exclaimed that the "breadth of the CDA's
coverage is wholly unprecedented." Id. at 2347.
S6 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
37
See id. at 631. The statute set forth a test to determine whether the material
was obscene as to minors. See id. The statute prohibited material that:
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
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sold in violation of the statute were obscene as to minors, yet merely
indecent as to adults." Noting that obscene speech is categorically
unprotected speech, the Court held that the statute was valid. '9 The
Court reasoned that material that is constitutionally protected for
adults may be obscene as to minors and, thus, restricted from minors.4 Ginsberg demonstrated that although adults may not be restricted from receiving indecent material in the print media, minors
may be prevented from exposure to that material by classifying it as
obscene as to them.
In 1973, after many years of struggling to define obscene
speech, the Court, in Miller v. Caifornia, 2 set forth the test for obscenity that is still the standard today.45 In Miller, the defendant had
been convicted under a California statute that prohibited the mail1965 N.Y. LAws 327.
The Court held that the statute was not void for vagueness because it adequately gave proper notice of the specific type of material that was illegal and it only
punished those who were aware of the type of material they were selling. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 643, 645.
See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634.
39 See id. at 635, 637.
40 See id. at 636. Justice Brennan explained that there is a distinction between
what adults consider obscene and what minors consider obscene. See id. The Justice noted that it is in the state's interest to help raise children without exposure to
harmful material. See id. at 639-40. However, the Court added, this statute allows
parental discretion and authority by permitting parents to buy such material for
their children if they so desire. See id. at 639.
41 See id.
42 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
43 See Elaine M. Spiliopoulos, The Communications Decency Act
of 1996, 7 DEPAuLJ.
ART& Er. L. 336, 341 (1996) (noting that the Miller standard is still used to test for
obscenity). See generally P. Heath Brockwell, Grapplingwith Miller v. California: The
Searchfor an Alternative Approach to Regulating Obscenity, 24 CUMB. L. REv. 131 (19931994) (tracing the history of the Court's attempts to define obscenity).
Justice Burger noted that there has never been a majority that has agreed on a
definition of obscene material subject to regulation. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 22.
The Miller test for obscenity is:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
The same year that Miller was decided, the Court applied this new standard for
obscenity to ParisAdult TheatreI v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (holding that Georgia
may regulate pornographic theaters so long as the films met the definition of obscenity set forth in Miller).
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ing of unsolicited, obscene material." The Court vacated Miller's
conviction"' and drafted a new definition of obscenity for federal and
state legislatures to follow.46 Justice Burger's opinion in Miller maintained that states have a legitimate interest in prohibiting obscene
material.47 Since obscene speech is categorically unprotected speech,
the Justice stressed that clear standards defining obscene speech are
necessary in order to give proper notice to speakers" and to permit
states to regulate obscene speech without violating the First
Amendment.49
The Court scrutinized the broadcast media, in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,"° in 1978. In Pacifica, the Court considered whether the
government may regulate constitutionally protected, indecent

44 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 15. The statute under
which Miller was convicted,
§ 311.2(a) of the California Penal Code, reads in pertinent part:
"Every person who knowingly: sends or causes to be sent, or brings or
causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this
state prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers to distribute, or has in his possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit
or offer to distribute, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor....
Id. at 18 n.1 (citations omitted).
"Obscene" material is defined under § 311 as material,
"[T]hat to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the
predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion,
which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters and is matter which is utterly
without redeeming social importance."
Id. (citations omitted).
45 See id. at
37.
46 See id. at 24. The California statute at issue in Millerwas based
on an obscenity
definition that the Court had previously drafted in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (1966). See Miller, 413 U.S. at 15. Miller, however, held that the "'utterly without redeeming social value'" test used in Memoirs was insufficient. Id. at 24 (quoting
Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 419). Prior to Memoirs, the Court had used an obscenity definition as set forth in Roth. See Brockwell, supra note 43, at 133-34.
Some scholars believe that the Miller test is inefficient because it uses an objective standard. See Brockwell, supra note 43, at 136. It is very difficult, however, for
judges or juries to use Milets test without allowing their own subjective viewpoints
to enter their opinions. See id.; see alsoWAUACE & MANGAN, supra note 17, at 254-55
(stating that the Supreme Court will overrule Miller because it allows community
standards as part of its test, yet these local standards cannot fairly be applied to a
global network such as the Internet).
47 SeeMiller, 413 U.S.
at 18.
48 See id. at
27.
49 See id. at 23-24.
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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speech transmitted over radio airwaves.5 Specifically, the Court determined whether an FCC order attempting to regulate offensive
language on the radio was valid."2 The Court stated that it is necessary to examine both the content and the context of speech during a
First Amendment analysis.'5 The Court concluded that the content
of the radio broadcast in Pacificawas protected indecent speech.- In
light of children's access to the radio medium, however, the Court
decided that special restrictions were appropriate." In its analysis,
the Court noted that broadcast media have traditionally received the
least amount of First Amendment protection.5
Furthermore, the
Court distinguished broadcast media from other media because offensive material may confront citizens in the privacy of their homes
and because "broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children." 7 The
51

See id. at 729. The FCC found the power to regulate under 18 U.S.C. § 1464

(1994), which stated that the FCC may prevent the use of, "'any obscene, indecent,
or profane language by means of radio communications,'" and 47 U.S.C. § 303 (g)
(1994), which obligates the FCC to "'encourage the larger and more effective use of
radio in the public interest.'" Id. at 731 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 & 47 U.S.C. §
3 3
0 (g)).
52 See id. A New York radio station broadcasted a
taped George Carlin monologue entitled "Filthy Words" over its airwaves at approximately 2:00 P.M., October
30, 1973. See id. A man and his young son were driving when they heard the
broadcast, which consisted of George Carlin repeating a list of dirty words over and
over again. See id. The man made a complaint to the FCC, which then issued an
order stating that the radio station could have been sanctioned. See id. at 730. The
FCC stated that rather than prohibit speech, it would use principles similar to the
laws of nuisance to channel the offensive language out of daytime hours. See id. at
731.
53 See id. at 744. The Court explained that content-based regulations are not always invalid. See id. The Court illustrated that context is an important element of
the analysis by quoting Justice Holmes, who said, "'the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done .... The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic.'" Id. (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
The Court cited additional cases in which content-based restrictions on speech had
been upheld. See id. at 745 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315

U.S. 568 (1942)).

See id. at 741.
See id. at 750. The context of the broadcast medium, the Court observed,
is
"uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read .... Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant." Id. at 749.
56 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
The Court stated that a broadcaster must be licensed with the government and may be stripped of its license if it is necessary for
the public interest. See id. Additionally, broadcasters are required to give air time
to the targets of their criticism. See id. (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
5

55

367 (1969)).

57 Id. at 748-49. The Court noted that if the FCC order had targeted this broadcast because of its political content or because of any other message it was trying to
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Court went on to affirm the FCC order and to hold that the Commission may regulate indecent speech in the broadcast media during
times when children are likely to hear it.5"
The Court continued its expansion of permissible regulations of
speech in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,59 which concerned
the regulation of adult movie theaters. 0 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, held that zoning ordinances may restrict
adult
• 61 movie theaters, a form of indecent speech, to certain areas of a
city.
The zoning ordinance in Playtime Theatres prohibited adult
movie theaters from locating near residential zones, churches, parks,
or schools. 62 The majority determined that the ordinance should be

classified as a time, place, and manner regulation because it did not
ban adult theaters, but merely prohibited them from occupying certain areas.6 The Chief Justice opined that the ordinance aimed to
lessen the secondary effects of the theaters rather than to alter the
actual content of the movies.64 Based on this reasoning, and the
Court's earlier decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres,6- Chief
convey, it would have been held invalid. See id. at 746.
58
See id. at 750-5 1. The theory that government may regulate unwanted speech
that can reach people's ears without warning has been referred to as the "Captive
Audience Doctrine." See Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85, 85 (1991); see also Christopher M. Kelly, "The Spectre of a

'Wired'Nation:"Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC
559, 571 (1997)
(stating that Pacifica provides a strong contention that restrictions on speech will be
upheld if they prevent harmful speech from reaching children).
The Court made sure to emphasize the narrowness of the holding. See Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 750. For example, the Court stated that this decision does not apply to a
.two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast of
an Elizabethan comedy." Id.
59 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
60 See id. at
43.
61 See id. at 54-55.
62 See id. at 43. An adult movie theater was defined as "'[a]n enclosed building
and First Amendment Analysis in Cyberspace, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH-.

used for presenting motion picture films, video cassettes, cable television, or any
other such visual media, distinguished or characteri[zed] by an emphasis on matter
depicting, describing or relating to 'specified sexual activities' or 'specified anatomical areas'.., for observation by patrons therein.'" Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
63 See id. at 46 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S.
50, 63 &
n.18) (1976)).
6
See id. at 47. The Court explained that the ordinance did not fit exactly into
either a "content-based" or "content-neutral" classification. See id. Although the
ordinance was aimed at secondary effects, it treated adult theaters differently than
other types of theaters. See id.
65 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
In American Mini Theatres, the Court held that a Detroit
ordinance, which prohibited any adult movie theaters, bookstores, or similar establishments from locating within 1000 feet of any other such establishment, or within
500 feet of any residential areas, did not violate the First Amendment. See id. at 62-
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Justice Rehnquist held that the applicable standard was whether the
ordinance served a substantial governmental interest and allowed for
reasonable alternative means of communication." The Court de67
cided that preserving the quality of life was a substantial interest.
Furthermore, the Court noted that alternate avenues of communication were available because the ordinance permitted ample locations
for adult theaters." The majority concluded that the ordinance was
valid because it did not suppress protected speech, but rather, channeled the speech to particular areas of the city."
The Court, in 1989, analyzed the telephone medium in Sable v.
FCC. 70 The majority determined that this medium, like the printbased media, should enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment. 71 In Sable, the Court examined a statute that placed an out-

right ban on all indecent and obscene speech made over interstate
telephone communications. Justice White, writing for the majority,
63. Although the ordinance differentiated between adult movie theaters and other
types of movie theaters, the Court reasoned that the ordinance was meant to prevent secondary effects on the community rather than to prohibit indecent speech.
See id.

66 See Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 50. The Court maintained that
this is the
standard applied to "content-neutral" time, place, and manner regulations. See id.
at 49.
67 See id. at 50.
The Court relied upon American Mini Theatres in stating that "a
city's 'interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be
accorded high respect.'" Id. (quoting American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71).
68 See Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 54. Respondents argued that some
of the
land zoned for adult theater sites was already occupied and that very little of the
unoccupied land was for sale. See id. at 53. They contended that the ordinance, in
effect, suppressed protected speech. See id. at 53-54. Justice Rehnquist responded
that the First Amendment does not require adult theaters to "be able to obtain sites
at bargain prices." Id. at 54. A reasonable opportunity to operate an adult theater
in Renton is all that the First Amendment requires, the Justice surmised. See id.
The Justice added that the ordinance was "narrowly tailored" to affect only adult
theaters that produce negative secondary effects. See id. at 52.
69 See id. at 54-55.
70 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
71 See id. at 131; see also Kelly, supra note 58, at 572 (analogizing
the level of review applied to the telephone medium with the level of review applied to the
print/common carrier medium). See generally George Koroghlian, Note, Indecent

Speech Relating to Commercial Telephone Messages is Constitutionally Protected While Ob-

scene Speech is Not - Sable v. FCC, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 547 (1990) (discussing the
Sable case in detail); Theresa M. Sheehan, Note, A Post-Sable Look at Indecent Speech
on the Airwaves and Over the Telephone Lines, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 347 (1993)

(discussing the history of Sable and an examination of post-Sable federal courts of
appeals cases applying Sable).
72 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 122-23. The Court noted that the dial-a-porn business
was large, with six to seven million calls during a six-month period in 1985. See id.
at 120 n.3. Prior to the amendment at issue in Sable, Congress added a provision to
the 1934 CDA that prohibited the use of a telephone to make "obscene or inde-
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reiterated the Court's previous position that obscene speech is unprotected speech that may be regulated.7 ' Next, the Court articulated that indecent speech may be regulated to promote a compelling interest, such as protecting minors, provided that the regulatory
statute is narrowly tailored.74 Justice White held that the statute in
Sable was not narrowly tailored and likened its effect to "'burn[ing]
the house to roast the pig.' 75 The Court found the government's
analogy to Pacifica unpersuasive. Justice White explained that the
telephone medium, unlike the radio medium in Pacifica, requires affirmative action by the customer."7 The Justice concluded that Concent" interstate speech for commercial purposes to minors or to other persons
without their consent. See id. at 120. Soon thereafter the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit struck down three different versions of FCC regulations. See id. at
121-22. The first version contained a defense for message providers who operated
between 9 P.M. and 8 A.M. and operators who required credit card payments. See
id. at 121. The Second Circuit ruled the time-channeling defense unconstitutional
as both overinclusive and underinclusive and instructed the FCC to examine alternatives. See id. The second version, which was again set aside, contained an access
code defense in place of time restrictions. See id. at 121-22. The third version
added a message-scrambling defense whereby users would be required to purchase
a descrambler in order to hear messages. See id. at 122. The Second Circuit held
these defenses constitutional, yet held the indecent speech restriction unconstitutional. See id. The amendment at issue in SabLe read in pertinent part:
"(b) (1) Whoever knowingly "(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device) any obscene or indecent communication for commercial purposes to any person, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call; or
"(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be
used for an activity prohibited by subparagraph (A),
"shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than
six months, or both.
Id. at 123 n.4 (quoting Pub. L. No. 100-297, 102 Stat. 424 (1988)).
73 See id. at 124. Sable argued that the amendment "create[d] an impermissible
national standard of obscenity, and ... compell[ed] them to tailor all their messages to the least tolerant community." Id. The Court responded that Sable could
choose to send or not to send its messages to whichever community it desired. See
id. at 125.
74 See id. at 126. The Court pointed out that the psychological and physical
wellbeing of minors has been recognized as a compelling governmental interest. See id.
76 Id. at 131 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
See id. at 127-28. Justice White explained that Pacifica'sholding was limited to
the context of the broadcast medium. See id. at 128 (citing FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S.
726, 750 (1978)). The "unique attributes" of broadcasting are not present in the
telephone context. See id. at 127-28 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the Court
noted that the statute in Sabe completely involved banned indecent material,
whereas the statute in Pacifica merely channeled indecent speech to times when
children were least likely to hear it. See id. at 127 (citations omitted).
77 See id. at 127-28. TheJustice explained that while small children may acciden-
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gress must regulate the telephone medium by less restrictive means
and cannot merely impose a blanket prohibition. 7 8
The Supreme Court examined cable television, the next major
medium of mass communication, in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC 7 ' The Court could not agree on a
clear standard of review for cable television because it failed to define the cable television medium and could not analogize cable television to any other media. 80 The provisions of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act8 ' (CTCPCA) contested in
Denver Area essentially allowed cable operators" to prohibit broadcasting that they believed to describe sexual activities or organs in
patently offensive manners." The Court analyzed the first provision
of the CTCPCA, which permitted cable operators to prohibit patently
offensive material on leased access channels, 84 under strict scrutiny."
tally hear radio broadcasts, people cannot accidentally pick up a phone and dial a
number. See id.
78 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 130-31. The Court noted that Congress did not research
the effectiveness of the FCC regulations concerning dial-a-porn well enough. See id.
at 130. The FCC regulations containing adult pass code and credit card number
defenses may have been effective, possibly allowing few minors access. See id. at 13031. Congress's amendment, however, did not consider these alternatives and,
rather, tried to limit all "telephone conversations to that which is suitable for children to hear." Id. at 131.
79 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
go See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 741-42; see alsojames L. Simmons, Note, The Continuing Struggle to Find a Place for Cable Television in the Pantheon of First Amendment
Precedent: Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 34
Hous. L. REv. 1607, 1635-36 (1998) (explaining the difficulties the court had analyzing the cable medium). See generally Comment, Pluralism on the Bench: Understanding Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1182 (1997) (suggesting that the Court, rather than make a definitive opinion, split into three separate factions).
The Supreme Court had analyzed the cable television medium in the context
of must-carry provisions in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622
(1994). Turner stated that cable television should not be analyzed under the same
standard as broadcast television. See id. at 637. Though the Turner Court clearly
applied an intermediate standard of review to the must-carry provisions, the Turner
Court did not establish what standard of review it would apply to content-based
regulations of speech in the cable television medium. See id. at 643, 661-62.
1 Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1486 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of

47 U.S.C.).

See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 733. "Cable operators" are generally the owners of
the actual cable networks. See id. A cable network conveys programming over numerous cable channels into subscribers' households. See id.
83 See id. at 732 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 531, 532(h) (1994)).
See id. at 737. Leased access channels are required by federal law to be reserved by cable system operators for commercial lease by third parties. See id. at
734. They comprise approximately 10% to 15% of cable channels. See id. The first
provision stated in pertinent part:
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The Court held this provision to be constitutional because of the
strong interest in preventing exposure of offensive material to childoen and because it did not require operators to ban speech. 86 Next,
the Court considered the second provision of the CTCPCA, which
requiredoperators to segregate and block patently offensive material
broadcast pursuant to the first provision, unless a subscriber requested access in writing. 7 The Court found this provision to be unconstitutional because it was overbroad' s Lastly, the Court examined the third provision of the CTCPCA, which was similar to the
first provision but related to public access channels. 89 The Court
found this provision to be invalid because it was not necessary to protect children and it was not narrowly tailored. 90 Rather than applying
a clear standard of review to the cable television medium, Denver
Area's ambiguous decision left the impression that cable television
will receive stronger protection than regular television or radio, but
somewhat less protection than telephones or print media.9 '
This subsection shall permit a cable operator to enforce prospectively
a written and published policy of prohibiting programming that the
cable operator reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured
by contemporary community standards.
47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (1994).
85 See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 743. The Court held that
this regulation would be
constitutional if it "address[ed] an extremely important problem, without imposing,.., an unnecessarily great restriction on speech." Id.
See id. at 747.
87 See id. at 753. 'The second provision required the FCC to promulgate
regulations
requiring cable operators to place on a single channel all indecent
programs, as identified by program providers, intended for carriage
on channels designated for commercial use under this section; requiring cable operators to block such single channel unless the subscriber
requests access to such channel in writing; and requiring programmers to inform cable operators if the program would be indecent as
defined by Commission regulations.
47 U.S.C. § 5320)(1) (1994).
a See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 7 60.
See id. Public access channels are channels that carriers are required to put
aside for public, educational, or governmental functions, and, in return, operators
receive permission to install cables . See id. The third provision provided that "a
cable operator may refuse to transmit any public access program or portion of a
public access program which contains obscenity, indecency, or nudity." 47 U.S.C.
§ 531(e) (1994).
90 See Denver Area, 512
U.S. at 7 66.
91 See id. at 741-42. The Court explained that "no definitive choice among
com,peting analogies ...allows us to declare a rigid single standard, good for now and
for all future media and purposes." Id. See generally Kelly, supra note 58 (providing
a detailed summary of Denver Area's numerous opinions and the different standards
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In the recent decision of Reno v. ACLU, 2 the Court explored the
newest member of the communications world - the Internet.' Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that although there is an
important interest to protect minors from receiving harmful material
on the Internet, the two contested provisions of the CDA prohibiting
"indecent" and "patently offensive" transmissions on the Internet
violated the First Amendment.9 4 The Justice first summarized the
district court's holding and the undisputed facts, including a thorough description of the Internet, sexually explicit material, and the
problem of age verification for users of the Internet. 5
The majority then turned to an examination of prior Supreme
Court cases upon which the government relied. 6 Justice Stevens
noted that these cases raised questions as to the CDA's constitutionality.9 7 First, the Justice distinguished Ginsberg by noting that the
statute in Ginsbergwas narrower than the CDA. 9' Next, the Court focused on Pacifica and determined that radio and television broadcasts differ from the Internet because radio and television are
uniquely accessible to children and they cannot give effective warnings of upcoming harmful material." Furthermore, Justice Stevens
noted that radio broadcasting has traditionally received the least
amount of First Amendment protection, due in part to the scarcity of
spectrum theory.00
utilized by the Justices).
92
117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
93 See id.
94 See id. at 2346.
95

See id. at 2334-37. The district court's findings of fact are the most extensive

judicial summary of the Internet and will most likely be used in future Internet law.
See Clifford M. Sloan, Decisions Reflect Nature of Media, NAT'L. L.J., Aug. 11, 1997, at
B8.
9
See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341-43.
97 See id. at 2341.
98 See id. In distinguishing Ginsberg,Justice Stevens first explained that
the statute in Ginsberg allowed parents to buy harmful material and let their children view
it. See id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)). In contrast, the
CDA did not permit parental consent to the transmission of such material. See id.
Second, the Justice observed that the New York statute at issue in Ginsberg only applied to commercial transactions, whereas the CDA applied to any transaction. See
id. ThirdJustice Stevens noted that the CDA did not define "indecent" or "patently
offensive," whereas the statute in Ginsberg confined its definition of harmful material with the prerequisite that it be "'utterly without redeeming social importance
for minors.'" Id. (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 646). Fourth, the Justice wrote that
whereas the statute in Ginsberg applied to 16-year-old minors and younger, the CDA
applied to those that are one year older (17). See id.
99 See id. at 2341-42.
100 See id. Scarcity of spectrum is the theory that there are a limited number of
channels available on the broadcast media. See WALLACE & MANGAN, supra note 17,
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Justice Stevens then distinguished Playtime Theatres.'0 ' He explained that the time, place, and manner analysis that the Court
used in Playtime Theatreswas not appropriate in this case. 0 2 While the
zoning ordinance in Playtime Theatres aimed to prevent the secondary
effects of indecent speech and allowed alternative channels of communication, the CDA was aimed directly at the content of "indecent"
and "patently offensive" speech, and applied to all of cyberspace. '°
The majority, therefore, concluded that none of the precedents
upon which the government relied required the Court to uphold the
CDA.]°4
The Court next distinguished the Internet from all other media
and stated that each medium of communication deserves its own
First Amendment analysis.' 5 Justice Stevens reiterated that the justifications for regulation in other media, such as scarcity of channels,0 6 the invasive nature of radio and television, 7 or the long history of regulation,' ° are not present in the Internet context.' °9 The
Court explained that while the invasive nature of broadcast media
allows exposure without warning, the Internet, like the telephone
medium, reuires individuals to take affirmative steps to reach harmful material. '0 Furthermore, the Justice noted that the Internet is
at 175. The FCC has the ability to use greater restrictions on the radio and television media because of scarcity of spectrum and the fact that the government assigns
the channels to broadcasters. See id.However, the Internet bandwidth is unlimited
and no governmental permission is required for a server to attach to it. See id.Providers on the Internet are considered publishers, rather than broadcasters. See id.
See also Press Groups, Feminists, Others Support Effort to Overturn CDA, 1997 ANDREWS
COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUS. LrrG. REP. 24,180 (1997) (discussing a related case

wherein the National Association of Broadcasters and ABC, NBC, and CBS argued
that the Supreme Court should refrain from holding that the Internet has a scarce
number of frequencies because of the rapid progression in telecommunications
technology).
101 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.
102 See id.

See id.
See id.at 2343.
105See id. at 2343-44. The Court relayed that "'[elach medium of expression ...may present its own problems.'" See id.at 2343 (alteration in original)
(quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975)).
106 See Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994).
107 SeeSable v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1989).
108 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969).
109 See Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2343. The Court quoted the district court's finding
that
affirmative action must be taken to receive harmful material over the Internet and
that, unlike television, such material will generally not suddenly appear on the
computer screen. See id. (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa.
1996)).
11 See id. The majority articulated the differences between the telephone me103
104
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not a scarce commodity."' Unlike broadcast media, Justice Stevens
explained, the Internet constitutes an unlimited, inexpensive means
of communication whereby "any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could
from any soapbox." 12 The Court, therefore, concluded that it could
not rely on any precedent to determine the standard of review for
government regulation of the Internet." '
The majority then proceeded to create a level of First Amendment scrutiny for the Internet that would set the stage for future Internetjurisprudence1 4 The Court held the CDA void for vagueness
because it failed to define precisely what speech warranted prosecuuon."' The majority noted that while the first provision proscribed
indecent speech, the second provision prohibited patently offensive
material."" Justice Stevens articulated that the linguistic differences
in the two provisions would cause uncertainty as to how the provisions related to each other, since neither provision defined its
terms."' The Justice stressed that the vagueness of a content-based
restriction, such as the CDA, raises First Amendment problems.'
dium and the "invasive" radio-television (broadcast) medium discussed in Sable. See
id. (citing Sable, 492 U.S. 115, 127-28).
"1
Seetid. at 2344.
112 Id. The Court further observed that an estimated 40 million
people use the
Internet today and that number may grow to 200 million by 1999. See id. (quoting
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831).
113See id.

114
See id. See generally Sloan, supra note 95, at B8 (describing Reno v. ACLU
as a
landmark decision).
115 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344. The Court did not reach the question of whether
the CDA was vague under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, since the majorit found the statute vague for purposes of the First Amendment. See id.
See id. (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (d) (West Supp. 1997)).
See id. If Congress leaves out language in one section yet includes it in another section, the Court will presume that Congress intended to omit or include
that language. See id.at 2344 n.36 (quoting Gonzon-Peretz v. United States, 498
U.S. 395, 404 (1991)). The Court posited: "Could a speaker confidently assume
that a serious discussion about birth control practices, homosexuality, the First
Amendment issues raised by the Appendix to our Pacifica opinion, or the consequences of prison rape would not violate the CDA?" Id. at 2344.
Ia See id. Recalling a previous case, the Justice was concerned about the vagueness of the CDA because of its effect on free speech. See id.(citing Gentile v. State
Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-51 (1991)). In Gentile, the petitioner violated a
rule that prevented lawyers from making extra-judicial statements to the media that
they knew would affect an adjudicative proceeding. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033.
The lawyer had held a press conference just following his client's indictment on
criminal charges. See id. The Court held the rule void for vagueness because it
failed to give fair notice. See id.at 1048, 1057-58. Furthermore, the Court stated
that "It]he prohibition against vague regulations of speech is based in part on the

need to eliminate the impermissible risk of discriminatory enforcement. . . ." Id. at
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Furthermore, the Court noted that the risk of criminal sanctions arising from the CDA would most likely keep people silent.1 9
The majority rejected the government's argument that the CDA
was no more vague than the obscenity test upheld in Miller.'20 The
Court noted that while the Miller test requires unprotected material
to appeal to the prurient interest of the average person; be patently
offensive; and lack any "'serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,"' the CDA only addressed whether the material was patently offensive.' 2' Additionally, Justice Stevens explained that while
the Miller test requires "patently offensive" material to be defined by
state law, the CDA had no such requirement. 22 Moreover, the Court
articulated that the Miller test sets forth a national "societal value"
requirement with which to judge the material, whereas the CDA only
set forth a contemporary community standard requirement.12 The
majority determined that this "societal value" requirement would
provide 114 courts with a uniform standard regarding prohibited
speech.
The Court concluded that the CDA could have been
drafted more2 5precisely and that its vague form violated the First
Amendment.

Next,Justice Stevens examined the overbreadth of the CDA and
its inevitable conflicts with the First Amendment.'2
The Justice
opined that the CDA repressed speech that adults have a constitu-

1051.
119
120

See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-45.
See id. at 2345. The Court likened the indecent and the patently offensive

provisions of the CDA to the second prong of the Miller test. See id. The Court reasoned that while Miller's three-prong test was not vague, "it does not follow that one
of those limitations, standing by itself, is not vague." Id.
:
Id. (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
22 See id. The Court explained that determining
what is "prurient interest" or
.patently offensive" are questions of fact; the nation is too large to articulate one
standard for all 50 states. See id. n.39 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 30); see also supra
note 43 for the Miller test. The Court exemplified, "Even though the word 'trunk,'
standing alone, might refer to luggage, a swimming suit, the base of a tree, or the
long nose of an animal, its meaning is clear when it is one prong of a three-part description of a species of gray animals." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2345 n.38.
3 See id. at 2345. See generally Donald T. Stepka, Note, Obscenity On-Line: A
TransactionalApproach to Computer Transfers of Potentially Obscene Material,82 CORNELL
L. REV. 905, 915-19 (1997) (discussing the different views of which geographical
community to use for the Miller community standards). Stepka argues that a virtual
community standard is inappropriate for the Miller test and that courts should use
standards of the supplier's/provider's community. See id. at 908.
12 See Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2345.
'5
See id. at 2346.
12 See id. at 2346-48.
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the Justice elaborated, protects speech that is indecent, yet not obscene.
The majority noted that while preventing children from accessing harmful materials is an important governmental interest, this
interest does not justify regulations that prohibit adults from accessing protected speech." The scope of the CDA's coverage was unlike
any other restriction that had ever been upheld by the Court, the
Justice observed.' " Justice Stevens explained that the CDA covered
both commercial and noncommercial speech, as well as nonpornographic material containing educational value."" The majority declared that even though there is an important interest at issue, there
must be an inquiry to determine whether Congress has narrowly tailored its statute. "' Justice Stevens described numerous alternatives
to the CDA: "tagging" harmful material;'" creating exceptions for
material with educational or artistic value; allowing tolerance for parental control; and regulating certain areas of the Internet, such as
web sites and chat rooms, differently than others.' " The Justice declared that, in light of Congress's failure to deliberate the potential

See id. at 2346.
See id. (quoting Sable v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (standing
for the
proposition that speech that is indecent, yet not obscene, is protected by the First
Amendment)).
127

128

129

See id.

See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 234 7 .
1 See id.
13 See id. at 2346-47 (citing Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Con1O

sortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996)). The district court compared the CDA to the
restriction on "dial-a-porn" that was invalidated in Sable. See id. at 2346 (citing

ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 854 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Justice Stevens, following
Sable, remarked that even though there was an important interest in protecting
children from harmful material, that did not end the First Amendment inquiry. See
id. (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 129). The government asserted that since the CDA required knowledge that the recipient is a minor, adult to adult communication
would not be hindered. See id. at 2347. The Justice declared that this was incorrect.
See id. The Court explained that if an individual was in a 100-person chat room and
knew that one person was a minor, this would certainly burden the communication
between adults. See id. The majority restated the district court's findings that there
will soon be computer programs available that parents may buy to prevent children
from accessing harmful material on the Internet. See id. (citing Reno, 929 F. Supp.
at 842).
133 See Spiliopoulos, supra note 43, at 350. Tagging is a method whereby a provider could place a tag on the contents page of indecent or patently offensive material so that client software or a server will recognize the tag and either allow or deny
access. See id.
3

See Reno, 117S. Ct. at 2348.
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problems of the CDA and any possible alternatives," ' the CDA was
not narrowly tailored.' 6
The majority then examined the three arguments the government made to advance the notion that the CDA was not overbroad. 17
First, Justice Stevens dismissed the idea that there were "alternative
channels" of communication; the Justice explained that the "time,
place and manner" inquiry is inapplicable when a statute regulates
speech based on its content.'" Second, the Justice declared that the
"knowledge" requirement and the "specific child" element '9 did not
rescue the CDA from overbreadth.'4 The majority supported this
conclusion by noting that the Internet is open to everyone and that
the proposed requirements would instill powers of censorship upon
opponents of indecent speech.14 ' Lastly, the Justice rejected the government's contention that educational, scientific, or other valuable
material would always fall outside the "indecent" and "patently offensive" provisions of the CDA.' 42

The Court next focused on the government's remaining arguments that the safe harbor defenses' 43 provided in the CDA re,35See id. at 2346-47 n.41. The Court noted a similar lack of congressional
inquiry into the Sable statute. See id. Compare Sable, 492 U.S. at 130 ("No Congressman
or Senator purported to present a considered judgment with respect to how often
or to what extent minors could or would circumvent the rules and have access to
dial-a-porn messages."), with Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2338 n.24. (stating that the CDA
provisions that became law were not subject to any hearings).
,36See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
137 See id. The three
arguments were:
(1) that the CDA is constitutional because it leaves open ample
"alternative channels" of communication; (2) that the plain meaning
of the Act's "knowledge" and "specific person" requirement significandy restricts its permissible applications; and (3) that the Act's
prohibitions are "almost always" limited to material lacking redeeming
social value.
Id.
13 See id. (citing Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n
of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980)). The Court stated that "[tihe Government's position is
equivalent to arguing that a statute could ban leaflets on certain subjects as long as
individuals are free to publish books." Id. at 2348-49.
139 See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d)
(1996) (stating that the "specific child" element
and the "knowledge" requirement attempt to prohibit indecent material only to
persons known to be under 18 years of age).
140 See Reno, 117 S. Ct.
at 2349.
141 See id. The Justice recognized
that an opponent of indecent speech might
simply log on to a chat room and inform everyone that his 17 -year-old child was
present. See id. The Court referred to this power as a "heckler's veto." See id.
142
143

See id.

47 U.S.C. § 223(e) (5) (1996). The safe harbor defenses provide in
full:
It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a) (1) (B) or (d) of
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deemed the Act.'" First, although the CDA, provided immunity to
people who tagged their harmful material, the Justice declared the
provision illusory due to the requirement that the efforts to tag the
material be "effective."' 4 Next, the majority explained that safe harbor provisions for adult identification and verified credit cards were
not economically practicable for most noncommercial orators."
The Justice concluded that the CDA defenses did not create the type
of "narrow tailoring" that would save an otherwise unconstitutional
provision, and noted that the CDA was even more menacing than
the restriction rejected in Sable, where147the restraint "amounted to
'burn [ing] the house to roast the pig."
Lastly, Justice Stevens examined whether the invalid provisions
of the CDA should be severed, leaving the remainder of the CDA intact.'" The Court held that the severability clause was applicable in
only one respect. 49 Obscene speech, the Justice remarked, has been
consistently viewed as unprotected speech. 50 Therefore, the Justice
concluded, the word "indecent" should be severed from the CDA,
leaving the rest of the first provision standing to prohibit the transmission of obscene speech. 5 Accordingly, the majority affirmed the
this section, or under subsection (a) (2) of this section with respect to
the use of a facility for an activity under subsection (a) (1) (B) of this
section that a person (A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication specified in such subsections, which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict
minors from such communications, including any method
which is feasible under available technology; or
(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring
use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or
adult personal identification number.
Id.

144See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2349. For a summary of the CDA defenses, see Spiliopoulos, supra note 43, at 349-51.
145Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2349. The Court recognized that the software necessary to
allow all recipients to screen harmful material is not currently available and thus
could not be "effective." See id.
146See id. The Court noted the possibility that commercial entities posting obscene material might be immune from the CDA whereas noncommercial speakers
sending indecent material with artistic value would not receive any benefit. See id. at
2349 n.47.
147 Id. at 2350 (quoting Sable v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
127 (1989)).
148 See id.
149 See id.

15 See id; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining that obscene
speech is categorically unprotected).
15 See Reno 117 S.Ct. at 2350.
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district court's holding and concluded that there is a greater interest
in promoting freedom
of expression than in any theoretical benefits
12
of censorship.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Renquist, wrote a
separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.5 " Justice
O'Connor argued that what the majority referred to as the "patently
offensive" provision was in reality two separate provisions:
the
"specific person" provision,' and the "display" provision.' 5 Next,
Justice O'Connor stated that the CDA was an effort to create "adult
zones" within the Internet.'
Zoning laws, the Justice noted, are
valid so long as they do not overly constrict adults' access to the material and minors have no right to view or read the banned material. 7
Justice O'Connor articulated that adult zones are easy to create in
the physical world because geography and people's identities are
clear.' -" In contrast, the Justice noted, it is difficult to delineate adult
zones in the cyberworld, where people's identities are masked.' 9 Justice O'Connor maintained that, although there are some semblances
of geography on the Internet such as chat rooms, at the present time
cyberspace is still unzoned.1 60 For this reason, the Justice concurred
with the majority that the "display" provision is unconstitutional.' 6'
However, Justice O'Connor opposed the majority's contention
that the "indecent" and "specific person" provisions are unconstitu-

152See id. at 2351.

153See id. (O'Connor, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15
See id. at 2352 (O'ConnorJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Justice noted that it is an offense knowingly to send patently offensive material to a
specific person under the age of eighteen.
See id. (citing 47 U.S.C.

§ 223(d) (1) (A)).

155 See id. The Justice explained that it
is an offense to display patently offensive
material, "'in a[nyl manner available' to minors."
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 223(d) (1) (B)).
'5
See id.
157 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2353 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
See id.
159
1

See id.

See id.at 2353-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The Justice also explained that user-based zoning is mostly non-existent today because the majority of people do not have their web pages "tagged" nor do they have
the software to recognize these "tags." See id. at 2354 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); cf Stepka, supra note 123, at 928 (recognizing that the
Internet is so diverse that no single paradigm can adequately define its parameters).
161
See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2354 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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tional.6 2 These provisions,Justice O'Connor declared, could be constitutional if they were applied to situations in which one adult conversed with one or more minors.'" The Justice explained that if another adult were to enter the conversation, however, the provisions
would be invalid because they would obstruct protected speech between adults.'6
Therefore, Justice O'Connor opined that the
"indecent" and "specific person" provisions were valid to the extent
that they applied to Internet communications where it was known to
the sender that the recipients were minors. ' Lastly, though the majority did not rule on the issue,Justice O'Connor concluded that the
CDA did not interfere with minors' First Amendment rights.'
By rejecting the application of standards used for other media
of mass communication, the Court recognized that the Internet is its
own medium entitled to full First Amendment protection. Although
the Internet embodies characteristics of other media, it is unique in
that it provides access to a virtually limitless amount of information,
it enables users to communicate in a variety of ways, and it allows for
the free dissemination of ideas and data.
The government's interest in protecting children from exposure to harmful material is concededly important, if not compelling.
However, the Court correctly held that the interest in preserving
adults' constitutional rights to protected speech is more important.
Reno v. ACLUis monumental to the extent that it eliminates contentbased regulation of speech on the Internet.
New technological developments may one day emerge to
change the present structure of the Internet, and these developments may provide Congress with the means to regulate the Internet. Perhaps one day the Internet may be channeled through two
separate zones - one for minors and one for adults. In this event,
zoning laws regulating the Internet, similar to the regulations upheld in Playtime Theatres, would most likely pass constitutional mus-

162
163

See id.
See id. at 2355 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissentng in part). The

Justice gave examples such as an adult sending an indecent e-mail to a person
known to be a minor or an adult in a chat room with only persons known to be minors. See id.
164 See id.
165
1

See id. at 2356 (O'ConnorJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part).

See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part). Justice O'Connor based this conclusion on Ginsberg's holding that material indecent as to adults may be considered obscene as to minors. See id. (citing
Ginsberg v. NewYork, 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968)).
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ter. 67 It is also possible that the Internet will merge with other media
such as the telephone or cable television media. If the Internet were
to merge with the telephone medium, the Court would probably
continue to apply strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions on
speech, given that both the telephone and Internet media currently
receive strong First Amendment protection. On the other hand, a
cable television-Internet merger would most likely prompt the Court
to permit some content-based speech regulations, owing to the fact
that cable television is a less-protected medium than the Internet or
the telephone medium.
Today, however, Congress does not have many viable ways to
regulate the Internet. Nonetheless, in the near future, it is apparent
that Congress will seek to regulate the Internet to some extent."8
Congress may attempt to impose a self-rating system on Internet users. This idea, however, would be analogous to requiring every
magazine or newspaper article to have a rating. Such a requirement
would probably be unconstitutional due to its chilling effect on
speech. The best solution to protect children on the Internet seems
to be through the use of Internet screening software, which would
enable parents to censor materials. g A law requiring Internet serv167 See April Mara Major, Internet Red Light Districts: A Domain
Name Proposalfor
Regulatory Zoning of Obscene Content, 16J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 21, 22-23
(1997) (stating the proposition that today, certain types of zoning regulations of the
Internet might be constitutional).
168
Numerous bills relating to the Internet have been introduced in the
past year;
none, however, attempt to regulate speech. An amendment to the Communications Act of 1934 would prohibit Internet servers from opening an account for
sexually violent predators. See S. 1356, 105th Cong. (1997). The "Safe Schools Internet Act of 1998" would require a system to filter or block Internet material on
computers in schools and libraries. See Safe Schools Internet Act of 1998, H.R.
3177, 105th Cong. (1998). The "Internet Freedom and Child Protection Act of
1997," an amendment to the Communications Act of 1934, would force Internetaccess providers to offer screening software to customers. See Internet Freedom and
Child Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 774, 105th Cong. (1997). The "Family-Friendly
Internet Access Act of 1997," an amendment to the Communications Act of 1934,
would require Internet servers to provide screening software to parents. See FamilyFriendly Internet Access Act of 1997, H.R. 1180, 105th Cong. (1997). The "Internet
Protection Act of 1997" would ensure that the future development of the Internet
and interactive computer services are unencumbered by federal and state regulation. See Internet Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 2372, 105th Cong. (1997).
169 Examples of these software programs are
CyberPatrol and SurfWatch, which
both filter out harmful material by looking for key words that may signify indecent
or obscene material. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2354 (O'Connor,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Recently, a group of engineers agreed on a technical standard to filter the World Wide Web. See Amy Harmon, Technology to Let Engineers Filter the Web andJudge Content, N.Y. TIMEsJan. 19, 1998, at D1. The standard is known
as PICS (Platform for Internet Content Selection). See id. The PICS technology has
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ers to provide this option to parents would most likely be found constitutional .70

Every medium of mass communication poses dangers to children. However, all too often society blames youths' problems on
communication media. As compelling as society's interest in protecting children is, those advocating censorship fail to realize that
the benefits of free expression through mass media outweigh the
possible threats. The Internet has opened new doors to communicate, and the value of free speech compels the government to refrain
from forcing them shut through censorship. Although Congress will
undoubtedly draft new bills in the upcoming years further addressing this dynamic medium, Reno stands as recognition of the Internet
as a valuable tool of communication, and it preserves one of the
most precious ideals for which our country stands: free speech.
WalterJ.DorganIII

already been incorporated by several Internet servers in order to define precisely
which parts of the web should be filtered. See id. Numerous free speech advocates,
however, fear that this technology could be used by the government to block constitutionally protected speech. See id.
170 An additional possibility that Congress should consider
is legislation directed
at individuals who transmit indecent material to minors and then lure them to meet
in person. See N.Y. Penal Law § 235.22 (McKinney Supp. 1997) (making it illegal
knowingly to send sexually oriented material to a minor and then by the use of such
communication induce or invite such minor to engage in sexual conduct). A New
York state court has already found that this type of law does not threaten freedom of
speech. See People v. Barrows, 664 N.Y.S.2d 410 (Sup. Ct. 1997). In Barrows, the
government set up a sting operation whereby an undercover officer in a chat room
on America Online pretended to be a minor. See id. at 411. The defendant, while
under the belief that the agent was a 13-year-old female, transmitted sexually oriented speech to the agent through e-mails and through conversations in chat
rooms. See id. at 411-12. The defendant then asked the agent to meet with him in
person. See id. at 412. The government arrested the defendant after he approached
a minor female he believed to be the person he talked with. See id. The New York
trial court held the statute constitutional because it required the Internet user to
meet with the minor in person. See id. at 413. This problem is a growing concern as
the population of the cyberspace community continues to expand every year. See
Debra Lynn Vial & Mary Jane Fine, Making Students Net-Wise, THE RECORD (OF
HACKENSACK), Mar. 16, 1998, at Al. Schools and local police are making efforts to
educate children of these dangers. See id.

